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Dulles Urges No Stronger Curbs on CIA

Warns of Espionage, Defends Agency's Bay of Pigs Role

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Allen Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, opposes any further congressional curbs on the CIA. And he warns "we are faced with an antagonist that has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height."

Dulles, who headed CIA at the time of the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion, repeats earlier denials that the CIA forecast any general uprising of the Cuban civilian population in the wake of the landings.

Dulles presents his views in a wide-ranging article on intelligence to be published in full in the Encyclopedia Britannica's "Book of the Year" and in part in the April issue of Harper's magazine. The article was made public yesterday for limited quotation by news media.

Much of his 41,000-word article is a history of intelligence methods and it carries an appeal for public understanding of the role of intelligence in the Cold War with the Communist world. It includes criticism of what Dulles sees as an American inclination "to talk too much about matters that should be classified."

Replies To Criticisms

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco and off and on before and since, the CIA has been criticized. Some have contended Congress should exercise tighter control of the secret agency's expenditures, which now are carefully concealed in the published budget figures.

On this subject, Dulles writes:

"I do not believe there is need for more controls on our intelligence work. Possibly the strongest argument against a special congressional watchdog committee is the fact that procedures have been set up—and have been functioning very well for a decade—whereby Congress (already) exercises its legislative control over what is, after all, very distinctly a function of the executive branch."

"Congress, of course holds the purse strings . . . Ap-

propriation of funds, obviously, gives the legislators a certain amount of control over the scope of operations . . . obviously, the entire CIA budget cannot be thrown open to general knowledge either in Congress or in the Executive branch. But any . . . impression that the Senators and Representatives can exert no power over the CIA is quite mistaken."

Predicting increasing Communist efforts in espionage and subversion, Dulles says:

"In the Soviet Union, we are faced with an antagonist that has raised the art of espionage to unprecedented height, while developing the collateral techniques of subversion, deception and penetration into a formidable political instrument of attack. No other country has ever before attempted espionage on such a scale."

In the furor that followed the Bay of Pigs disaster, some critics blamed poor intelligence, especially a purported estimate that the landings would touch off a wholesale rising of the civilian population against Fidel Castro's regime. The CIA denied at the time that it had contributed to the failure in this fashion. Dulles puts it this way in his article:

"Much of the press assumed at this time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and popular revolt in Cuba. Those who had worked as I had with the anti-Hitler underground behind the Nazi lines . . . during World War II, and those who had watched the tragedy of the Hungarian patriots in 1956, would have realized that spontaneous revolutions by unarmed people in this modern age are ineffective and often disastrous."

"I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would ensue."

Dulles says an intelligence service in this day of nuclear power "cannot wait for evidence of the likelihood of hostile acts against us until after the decision to strike has been made. Government must be forewarned and forearmed."

Of what he sees as the American penchant for talking and writing things that should be kept secret, Dulles writes:

"Also, there are times when our press is overzealous in seeking 'scoops' with regard to future diplomatic, political and military moves. We have learned the importance of secrecy in time of war, although even then there have been serious indiscretions, at times. But it is well to recognize that in the 'Cold War' our adversary takes every advantage of what we make publicly available."

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